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Where rapid urbanization strains the capacity of local governments
to provide necessary public services, municipal development funds
can channel new investments to municipalities and strengthen local
government.
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governments to expand their physical and social  but equity is a prominent objective, particularly
infrastructure. Crowded cities are short of funds  for investments in water supply, sanitation, and
and unable to attract investments to expand the  other neighborhood improvements. Typically the
facilities, services, and enterprises needed to  funds combine financing with measures to
upgrade urban areas. To compound the problem,  strengthen the financial and technical capacity of
municipal govemments, which bear most of the  local governments.
responsibility for urban areas, lack the financial
and technical resources.  Ti- date, a few of these funds have improved
the capacity of local governments to operate,
One way to route new investments to local  expand, or recover costs. But the record of
municipalities is to establish municipal develop-  recent minicipal development fund programs is
ment funds. These funds lend money to munici-  better. The new funds improve the distribution
pal clients (or provide a mix of grants and loans)  of funding for urban investment and strengthen
for long-term conventional investments in urban  municipal govemments. .
infrastructure, commercial plants, housing, and
other important facilities.  This paper is a background paper for the
1988 World Development Report.  Copies are
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intemational aid donors because they offer a  Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please
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Part  A:  Evolution  and Objectives
Introduction
1.  Interest  in Municipal  Development  Funds and the institutions
which handle  them  has revised  strongly  over the last five
years.  Several  existing  funds  are being reformed  and
recapitalised; new funds  are being created  in countries
like the Pailippines  where they  have not featured  before.
Strong  expectations  surround  their  potential  -role.
2.  The precise  objectives  oi these funds  vary from  country  to
country,  as does the  emphasis  among them.  But the  basic
problems  which they address  form  a common  context.  In
developing  economies  urban populations  are  growing  at the
rate of 3.8%  per annum,  i.e. nearly  double  the general  rate
of population  growth.  Huge absolute  increases  are still
being experienced  by the primate  cities  - half a million
a year in Cairo and  Mexico  City, a quarter  of a million in
Jakarta  and  Seoul.  But  the  majority  of  the  urban  population
is still  in cities  under five hundred  thousand  and  most
countries  proclaim  a policy  of physical  decentralisation
- of promoting  the development  of secondary  towns to relieve
pressure  on the  major conurbations.
3.  All cities  are experiencing  major difficulties  in expanding
their  physical  and social  infrastructure  to  cope with the
growth  in population.  It is particularly  difficult  for
the  secondary  towns,  which typically  lack  a base of
existing  plant,  skills  and influence  on  which to  build.Responsibility  also lies primarily with systems of
municipal government which  are usually the weakest  tier
in financial and technical resources.  Such systems have
often been undermined  by neglect or more deliberate  policies
of withdrawing  functions, revenue sources and general
political authority.
4.  Municipal Development  Funds have the basic purposes of
channelling  more investment  in urban infrastructure  through
municipal government and of strengthening  the capacity of
these institutions  in the process.  They have attracted
the support of international aid donors because they
offer a mechanism  for "wholeselling" urban i.'vestment,
i.e. for the provision of aid funds to wit  liffused
investments, often of a minute scale by donri standards.
5.  This paper seeks to describe  these developments in funding
channels and their intended institutions, and, so
far as possible, to evaluate them.  Judgement must however,
be extremely tentative,  since most of the recent round of
innovations and aid projects are at an early stage.
6.  Some initial definition  is necessary, though difficult
because the terminology has been used very loosely.
"Municipal Development Fund'(MDF)  is taken to mean a pool
of money operated at a level above that of the individual
municipality,  for investment  in urban infrastructure,
services and enterprise  through municipal government  or
its subsidiaries.  The literature often confuses Municipal
Development Funds  with the institutions - banks,secretariats,  associations etc - which control and channel
them.  This paper will however distinguish  the institutions
from the funds by describing  them asnmunicipal development
intermediaries"  (14DIs).
7.  The term "municipal" is widely used to describe  the
government  of towns, which  in many traditions have been
incorporated  "islands" of human settlement, divorced
from the administration of their rural hinterlands.
"Muiiicipal"  services are habitually urban in character.
In much of Latin America and the Philippines,however,
the "municipio" commonly  refers to a town and its
surrounding  rural area, which  are administered together.
In such cases municipal services may well include rural
facilities such as feeder roads, crop drying and storage,
and nurseries.
Historical Development
8.  MDFs and MDIs are far from new concepts.  Together with
Japan  every Western European country, barring the Republic
of Ireland and Switzerland, has a well established  central
institution channelling  investment credit to local government,
the majority  dating from the 19th Century.  Their origins
vary however.  The Belgium Municipal Credit Bank,  the Danish
Municipal Credit Association,  the Bank for Netherlands
Municipalities,  the Japan Finance Corporation for Municipal
Enterprises,  the Norwegian Municipal Bank and the Spanish
Local Credit Bank were all specifically established  to
provide loan finance for local government.  The CentralSavings Bank of Vienna  and the German Municipal Bank are
directly or indirectly under municipal control, but lend
to a variety of public  agencies and private enterprises
including  local  government.  The Municipal  Development  Fund
operated by the French Caisse des Depots et Consignations, the
Italidn Cassa Depositi e Prestiti and the Portuguese  Caixa
Geral de Depositos are effectively  "windows" within
institutions holding and investing a variety of state
controlled  savings, pensions  and insuranc:e  funds.
9.  It is worth noting that a number of the older European
institutions,  particularly those in Austria, France, Italy,
Portugal  and Spain,  were established  as much to provide
a reliable  outlet for private savings as to finance
public investment.  Indeed localised savings banks,
postal or municipal,were  (and in some cases remain)  their
principal source of funds.
10.  In the last thirty years MDFs have spread rapidly through
Africa, Asia and Latin America.  Brief research for this
paper has identified MDIs in twenty one third world
countries:  Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican  Republiu, Guatemala,  Honduras, India, Jordan,
Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua,  Niger, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Senegal, Tunisia, Turkey and Venezuela.  Loan channels
for municipal government operated directly by government
departments without an intermediary >.ave  been identified
in a further ten countries:  Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan,
Philippines,  Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda,
Zambia and Zimbabwe.  In Brazil and India funds operateat both national and some state or metropolitan  levels.
This list is probably incomplete.
11.  The form of these funds and institutions  varies widely.
But some common models and traditions  (partly colonial)
exist.  These ir-l"7ae:
(1)  Loans  funds  czr  local authorities operating out of
ministries  of local government.  These are
characteristic  of anglophone countries such as
Kenya,  Sri Lanka, Tanzania,  Uganda, Zambia and
Zimbabwe.  They are normally revolving funds,
capitalised  from government budgets, occasionally
with foreign aid supplements.
(2)  "Windows" for grants and loans to municipal  infra-
structure  ("Fonds d'Equipement CommunalI operated by
national "Caisse de Prets" managing  state controlled
pension, insurance and savings funds.  The model  is
found in francophone  states of North and West Africa
though reproduced in the erstwhile Brazilian National
Housing Bank.
(3) Autonomous  institutions for the promotion of
municipal  government  (Instituto de Fomento Municipal
or Instituto para Desarrollo  Municipal)  developed,
often with USAID assistance,  in several Latin American
countries - Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala,
Paraguay, and Venezuela  for example.  These bodieshave been intended  to supply  technical  assistance  and
training  as well as loAn  finance. A heavy emphasis
on development  of  municipal  water supply  and sewerage
systems  has characterised  these  bodies  and it  has
been common  for  them to design  and build such
facilities  directly,  handing  them  over to  municipal
enterprises  for operation  and debt service.
13.  Historically  few  of these third  world institutions  and
funds have developed  a capacity  for  sustained  assistance
to  municipal  government  and investment  on the scale  needed.
Most have been undercapitalised. They have tended  to play
a  narrow  and  passive  financing  role,  applying  little
technical  or financial  appraisal  to the  schemes  they have
funded,  and offering  little  positive  assistance  to
municipalities  other than capital  finance.  Those  which
have  been mandated  to provide  technical  assistance,  have
tended  to cohcentrate  skills  and resources  on the direct
execution  of  capital  works,  which are handed  over to
municipalities  for operation  and debt service; while
this has added to the stock of urban infrastructure,
it  has done little  to promote  the  capacity  or commitment  of
municipalities  to operate  or expand  it effectively  or to
recover  costs.  Repayment  disciplines  have not always
been maintained.  MDIs in Honduras,  Kenya and Morocco,
for example,  have experienced  (and  tolerated)  substantial
arrears,  and the latter  two made new  advances  to bodies
which were in default  on existing  loans.Recent Developments
14.  The 1980s have witnessed  a revival of interest in MDFs
and MDIs,  with  much encouragement  from the international
agencies.  World Bank loans to programmes involving
MDFs are in progress or under negotiation in at least
fourteen  countries  (Brazil, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jordan,
Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua,  Philippines, Senegal,  Sri
Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia and Turkey).  Other agencies
have been active also;  the Inter American Development
Bank, for example; has been assisting MDFs in Colombia,
Honduras, Panama and Paraguay.
15.  Each programme has distinct  characteristics;  there are
even significant variations  between World Bank assisted
programmes  in three Brazilian states  (Parana, Salvador
and Santa Catarina);  the same applies to programmes  in two
Indian states  (Tamil Nadu and West Bengal).  But virtually
all the programmes  are  concerned both with financing a
specific stream of urban  investment, and with  longer term
institutional development  - with enhancing the financial
and technical capacity  of municipal government, and of the
central institutions which  should or could support it.
16.  Two broad objectives  underlining  thesa programmes can
be  discerned.  The first is to mobilise additional
resources for urban public  investment.  The first step
is obviously  the initial injection of funds from the
donor and the counter-part contribution, usually larger,from  central  or state cgovexzrment.  (The  latter  may  be
further  enhanced  if the  donor funds  are capitalised,
i.e. repaid  fromthe  government  budget;  without  reimbursement
by the MDI).  A second  enhancemernt  may stem from the
capacity  of the  MDI to tap domestic  financial  markets
through bond and debenture  issues. But  ultimately  most
of these  programmes  aim to exact  additional  resources
from the  municipalities  themselves  through
- debt service  obligations
- operation  and  maintenance  expenditure
- using  any surplus  of revenue  over operationa  .penditure
for debt servicing  rather  than  direct  capital
expenditure
These aims are reinforced  by those  elements  of programme
expenditure  or covenant.s  which involve improved  revenue
administration  or more stringent  cost  recovery.
17.  The second  broad  objective  is to improve  the utilisation
of resources.  This is pursued  in a number  of directions
- injecting  rational  criteria  into  the  geographical
and sectoral  distribution  of  municipal  development
funds
- developing  the criteriaand  capacity  for sound
financial  and technical  appraisal  of projects
financed  by MDFs.
- persuading  gove<->aents  to substitute  distribution
through  MDFs for ad hoc capital  investment  programmes
- assisting  municipalities  with design  and exe^ution
of investment  programmes- iziproving  operatiqn qsd  maintenance of urban
infrastructure
18.  While these aims underlie most  if not all the current
programmes,  there are significant  differences in
emphasis.  The  Latin America programmes are particularly
concerned with rationalising  flows of government  finance
funds and improving municipal  access to them.  The Mexican
BANOBRAS Loan aims to encourage Mexican authorities
to borrow more on the strength of a recently improved
revenue base.  The  loan to BANMA Honduras is chiefly
to help improve municipal  revenues so that they can keep
BANMA in business.  The development of a capital grant/
loan programme  through the Calcutta Metropolitan
Development  Authority is only one part of a comprehensive
package of capital investment  and municipal reform in the
Calcutta Metropolitan  District.  World Bank assistance
to the development  of an MDF in Sri Lanka will follow
on a current intensive  package of technical assistance.
Despite similarities in context and aims, the wide.
diversity of practice among MDPs and MDIs needs  to be
recognised at this stage by looking at their detailed
characteristics.Part B:  Characteristics
Institutiozwal  Location
19.  An invez.tory  of MDFs and the agencies which administer
them is at Appendix A.  They are managed basically
either by a government ministry/secretariat  or by an
autonomous  institution.
20.  Direct administration by central government  is normally
in the hands of the Ministry of Local Government or the
Interior  (e.g. Kenya, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand,
Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe), but occasionally
handled directly by the Ministry of Finance  (e.g.
Indonesia and the Philippines).  In the case of
Nicaragua  and Parana and Santa Catarina states
in Brazil the Funds are controlled by state planning
secretariats.  Banks may however be used to channel the
loan, i.e. to disburse and recover on behalf of central
government.  This is the case with the Parana and  Santa
Catarina  funds, the Indonesian  7NPRES programmes  and the
Tunisian  CPSCL.
21.  "Autonomous" institution meansan agency with a separate
legal and financial identity.  The precise nature of the
institutions acting as MDIs varies widely,however,  together
with their degree of real autonomy  in  decision making.
A number of types can be described:
(1)  Municipal  Development Banks.  There are only a
few examples of such banks whose primary concern
is the financing  of municipal  investment, e.g.
the  Municipal  Credit Bank of Belgium, theDanish Municipal Credit Association, BANMA, Honduras,
the Jordan  CVDB,  the Bank for Netherlands
Municipalities  and the Municipal Bank of Norway.
The Kerala Urban Development Finance Corporation
acts virtually  in this capacity.
(2)  Municipal  "windows" within banks with a  wider
remit, e.g. BANOBRAS Mexico, the Colombian
Central Mortgage  Bank, the National Housing
Development  Bank of Senegal.
(3)  Municipal  "windows" within institutions  established
to manage state controlled pensions, insurance and
saving funds, as in Brazil, France, Italy, Morocco,
Niger  and Spain.  The Indian Life  Insurance
Corporation  specifically finances municipal water
enterprises.
(4)  Municipally  controlled  savings banks, which  lend
to a range of public and private agencies including
local government.  The Central Savings Bank of
Vienna and the German Municipal Bank are prime
examples.
(5)  Institutions established  to provide a range of
services  to local government  including credit,
technical assistance  and direct construction of
urban  infrastructure.  The Latin American
examples have already been described in paragraph 11 (3)The Iller Bank of Turkey has been particularly
involved in direct construction.
(6)  An association of municipalities  - the case in
the Dominican Republic.
(7)  A metropolitan  development authority.  The Calcutta
Metropolitan  Development Authority combines operation
of a programme of capital loans and grants to
municipalities  with other planning and investment
responsibilities.
22.  In the majority  of cases management  of these institutions
is appointed by central government, either under
statutory powers or as the sole/major share holder.
However, municipal government  is frequently represented
on boards of management  either as share holders or
by statutory right.  Such representatives  form the
majority  in the case of the municipally owned banks
(e.g. Austria,  Belgium, Denmark and Norway).
23.  There are very few but significant examples of private
sector involvement in the management  of MDFs/MDIs.
The French Real Estate Credit Corporation, which  lends
extensively  to municipalities  and other agencies for
housing development, is a limited company which  associates
government  and private capital in its shareholding  and
management.  The Colombian Central Mortgage  Bank uses
its Municipal Development Funds  tFFDU)  to discount  part
of loans advanced by commercial banks to municipalities.The British Public Works Loan Board is 100% Government
controlled, but its membership  is drawn equally from the
ranks of local government  and City finance institutions.
Sources of Funds
24.  At Appendix  B I have sought  to update a tabulation of
sources of finance for MDFs compiled by the United
Nations in 1972.
25.  In Japan and Western Europe  the MDFs have been very
largely funded by the financial markets.  Initial
subscription  of share capital by either central or
local government has  been important in establishing
control and credibility, but  insignificant as resources
for lending.  The mechanisms  for tapping the market
have varied,however.  Direct private savings deposits
have been important in Austria,  Belgium, Germany,  Italy
and Portugal, attracted in competition with commercial
outlets.  Otherwise financial  institutions - pensions
funds, insturance  companies,  commercial banks - have
been the major  sources, either  through bond issues or
directly negotiated  deposits.
26.  By contrast, the third world  MDFs have been largely
financed from public funds.  Most of the autonomous
MDIs have the power to offer bonds publicly, but few
do so.  Where private savings are tapped, it is normally
through loans from, or deposits by central banka or
state controlled pension and insurance funds.  The verylarge  loan operations of the Brazilian Housing Bank,  for
example, were basically financed from the 8% payroll
levy for retirement/unemployment  benefit.  (There are,
of course, exceptions;  both the Colombian Central
Mortgage  Bank and the Mlexican  BAUIOBRAS  have received
substantial funding from bond issues;  the Jordan
CVDB attracts time deposits by insurance companies).
International  donor finance has played some part in
capitalising MDFs, particularly where  loans to
governments  for this purpose have been passed on to
the Funds  in grant form.  Its significance has been
greater, however,  in establishing procedures, disciplines
and credibility  - though not always t( lasting effect.
27.  But the larger source of capital to most third world
MDFs has normally been appropriations  from government
budgets or direct allocation  from tax revenues.  The
Turkish Iller Bank now receives  3% of national tax
revenues, the IDM Paraguay  10% of real estate taxes,
2% of municipal current revenues, and a 2% tax on the
value of imported  liquor, the Calcutta Metropolitan
Development Authority  50% of octroi.
28.  Internal generation  is, of course, a further source
of finance to most Funds.  This is particularly  the
case wheie  initial capital from central government
or donors  is not repayable.  But even where  it is
reimbursable,  substantial resources can be generated
over time from "spread" with  imaginative management.
The Parana State Fund in Brazil, for example, isrepaying a World Bank loan over fifteen years, but on-
lending for three to eight year periods.  The Tamil
Nadu Fund hopes to build up 21% of its capital from
internal generation,  such as a 2.5% spread in interest
rates and borrowing with a  five year grace period but
lending with none.  Internal generation is now financing
58% of new lending by the CVDB, Jordan, 50% by BANOBRAS,
Mexico and 44% by the Colombian FFDU.
Grants and loans
29.  MDFs basically  lend money  to municipalities  for long
term investments at quasi-economic  rates of interest
(i.e. covering  interest obligations to providers of
capital plus costs of administration).  There are a
number of exceptions, however, involving elements of
grant or subsidised  interest.
30.  Grant elements arise in a number of forms:
(1)  Matching grants attached  to loans  (varying  from 100
to  200% in the case of Santa Catarina State
Brazil, or 0-30% in Mexico, depending on the
size and revenue capacity of the municipality).
(2)  A mix of grant and loan depenling on the nature
of the project.  For example, Calcutta Metropolitan
Development Authority  allocations consist of:
- 100% loan for markets and water supplies
- 2/3rds loan 1/3rd grant for drains, parks,
roads, terminals etc
- 100% grant for slum improvement.(3)  A grant/loan  mix varying with the repayment
capacity  of the municipality  in Honduras.
(4)  Direct  central government expenditure on trunk
infrastructure within a Philippines Municipality
to the value of 40% of loans it obtains for
other work.
31.  Interest rates may be subsidised  also in a number of
forms:
(1)  Government  sharing the cost of interest payments
to the Fund with the municipality  (3:7 in Mexico,
50:50 in Senegal).
(2)  Interest rates varying with the size of the city
(Colombia).
(3)  Interest rates varying with the nature of the
project  (Parana State, Brazil)
(4)  MDFs receiving reverue from grants or tax shares
which  allow low rates of interest to be charged
(e.g. 2-4% in Tunisia).
Eligibility
32.  Normally all municipal  authorities are eligible  for loans
from MDFs.  Allocations  may simply depend on bids by
individual authorities, with some assessment of priorities
if funds are inadequate  to meet them all.  Alternatively
municipalities  may be given a quota within which  to apply,
as in the case of the Calcutta FAM.  In a few cases
allocations  are linked to national targets for particularsectoral  investments  (the  case of the Indonesian  Market
Loan programme  in the past,  or primary  health  centre
loans in  Uganda in the 1960s).
33.  Some restrictions  by size  or location  may, however,  be
attempted. Capital  cities  are excluded  from  borrowing  from
the Fund in Costa Rica, Jordan  and Paraguay,  and four
large  cities  in Panama.  Santa  Catarina  Fund is
restricted  to  municipalities  of less than fifty thousand
population,  the  Calcutta  Fund  to  local  authorities  in  the
Calcutta  Metropolitan  District,  the Salvador  Fund in
Brazil  to  the  Salvador  metropolitan  region.
34.  Other  tests  of  eligibility  may  be applied,  apart  of
course  from  normal  debt service  criteria.  These relate
chiefly  to preparation  of investment  programmes  and
acceptance  of operating  and revenue  administration
guidelines  which will be discussed  later.
Objects  of Investment
35.  The most common  objects  of MDF investment  are the
conventional  elements  of municipal  infrastructure:
water supplies,  sanitation,  drainage,  roads,  street
lighting,  flood control,  refuse  collection  and
disposal,  markets,  slaughter  houses  and  bus terminals.
36.  Other  objects  of investment  which are sometimes
included  are:
(1) Vehicles  and equipment.
(2)  Tax mapping.(3)  Productive plant, e.g. industrial  workshops
and estates,  crop nurseries,  storage and
drying facilities.
(4)  Recreational facilities.
(5)  Social infrastructure  - schools,  clinics etc.
(6)  Commercial premises - offices,  shops etc.
(7)  Ho4sing development.
Security  and debt service
37.  Assessing the debt service capacity  of the  Municipal
clients is one of the most difficult  aspects of managing
an MDF.  Most funds rely simply  on the statutory
limitations  on the incurring of long term debt which are
regular features  of municipal government  systems.
38.  Such limitations  normally consist  of a conventional set
of ratios  of debt or debt service  to revenue.  In the
case of the Santa  Catarina Municipalities  in Brazil a
composite set of ratios applies:
- Total outstanding  debt must not exceed 70%
of the previous  year's total  revenue.
- The debt contracted in one year must not exceed
20% of annual revenue.
- Debt service should not exceed 15% of previous
year's revenue.
The  latter stipulation  also applies in Indonesia and Tunisia.
15% of annual revenue represents  a typical legal
limit on debt service.
39.  The difficulty,  of course, is that formula  ratios of
this type are not particularly  helpful in predicting
the real impact  of increased  debt charges on amunicipal  budget.  In the  case of a self liquidating
investment  - water  supplies or markets,  for example
- capacity  to service  a loan depends  upon the ii,ternal
financial  viability  of the investment  project,  not on
the general  state  of the  municipal  budget.  In the
case of non-self  liquidating  projects  - roads,  schools
etc - capacity  to  repay a  loan depends  upon  current  revenues
exceeding  regular  commitments  (personnel,  operation  and
maintenance); ability  to service  a loan  should  be judged
by estimating  the foreseeable  trends  in  both elements.
The French  Caisse  des  Depots  bases its lending  to
individual  municipalities  on financial  forecasts,  not on
debt service  ratios.  The Jordan  CVDB has  had to
change  its eligibility  criteria  to individual  financial
forecasts,  after the  misleading  quality  of debt service
ratios  became  clear.
40.  Two of the Indian  experiments  represent  serious  attempts
to reconcile  lending  targets  to municipal  capacity.  In
the case  of the  Calcutta  Metropolitan  District,  debt
service  is part of the  notioaal  expenditure  forecast
used in calculating  deficit  grants,  which assume
certain  target  levels  of frugality  in  spending  and
efficiency  in revenue  collection.  (A  very similar
provision  existed  in Uganda  in the 1960s). In the
case of the Tamil  Nadu Fund (still  under negotiation)
a varying  mix of grant  and loan is to be used to  keep
debt service  within limits  established  for each
municipality  by a forecast  of expenditure  and revenue,
again assuming  target  standards  of performance.41.  Assessing  the capacity of municipalities  to service
MDF  lending does appear in most cases to be a somewhat
superficial process.  The rea,ns  are possibli two-fold.
The first is that most Funds assume that enhanced
ability to service loans will result from the various
incentives built into their lending.  The second is
that most do not have a  worry since loans are
secured by liens on inter-governmental  transfers.  In
several cases national revenue shares are credited
initially to the municipalities'  accounts with the MDI,
so that recovery of loans involves no more than a
journal entry.
Incentives  to municipal  performance
42.  MunicipalDevelopment  Institutes  in Latin America
were intended from the outset to combine lending
with the promotion of municipal  capacity through
technical assistance  and other incentives.  Such
aims have become characteristic  of recent programmes
in other regions to create or enhance MDFs.  The
instruments can be divided into those concerned with
the quality of expenditure  and services, and those
concerned with the revenue base.
43.  the most common and basic  concern of recent MDF programmes
has been to improve the technical appraisal of investments
financed by them.  Donor  aid has focussed upon developing
appraisal skills on the part of MDI staff and the
imposition of technical standards and criteria with which
projects  should comply.  Minimum engineering design
specificatiors  are an obvious component of such standards,but economic  and social equity criteria are also
prominent;  simple designs and standards offering  a
service to a high proportion  of low income users and
residents characterise these specifications, particularly
for investments  like water  supplies, slum improvement,
solid waste management  or sanitation.
44.  But the concern in a number of cases extends beyond  the
scope of the immediate project.  Several MDFs such as
those in Salvador and Santa Catarina, Brazil, Nicaragua,
the Philippines  or Tamil Nadu State,India, insist that
projects  can only be financed within the framework of
medium term investment plans which municipalities  must
produce  to qualify for assistance.  BANMA,  Honduras,
requires municipalities  to produce plans of action for
improved operation and maintenance  of services.  Several
of the Latin American MDIs provide assistance with surveys,
physical  zoning and traffic plans.  The beneficiary
municipalities  in the Philippines must establish mayoral
task forces to improve operation and maintenance of
services.  The Calcutta Metropolitan Development programme
including the MDF also seconds technical staff from state
government  to all municipalities.
45.  On the revenue side the most common focus is on cost
recovery practices.  Conditions  for MDF assistance  are
fairly standard.  Water supply schemes, markets,
commercial  refuse collection,  slaughter houses and bus
terminals must be fully financed by user charges, rents
and fees covering both operation and maintenance and
amortisation  of debt.  Investment in non-self liquidatingprojects,  such as roads,  domestic  refuse  collection  and
social  services,  must be accompanied  by improvement  in
taxation.  Technical  and financial  assistance,  tax
mapping,  consumer  listing  etc may be part of the  MDF
intervention. Specific  rivenue  convenants
imposed.  The Calcutta  Municipal  Corporation,  for
example,  was committed  to increase  its  water rates and
introduce  metered  charges  for  commercial/industrial
users,  and improve  collection  of property  tax  from
60% of demand  in 1982/83  to 85% by 1987/88.  Salvador
City was required  to make a similar  improvement  in
collection  efficiency  and increase  the  number  of
registered  taxable  properties  from 360,000  to 450,000
by 1987.  BANMA,  Honduras,  has taken  over responsibility
for collecting  revenue  arrears  in the  Central  District.
Finally,  training,  particularly  in  budgetary  and
financial  control,  has been organised  by several  MDFs;
acceptance  of training  support  has been a condition  of
loans  in Mexico  and the Philippines.
46.  A number  of programmes  have been explicitly  designed  to
encourage  municipalities  to  borrow.  Simplifying  access
to  loan  finance  is  one  element  in  this  together  with
training  in  the  procedures.  The  World  Bank's  BANOBRAS
Loan aims to reduce  interest  structures  from  over fifty
to one, signatures  from sixty five  to three,  and
processing  time from as much as five  years to an average
of three  months.  The Colombian  Central  Mortgage  Bank  has
produced  excellent  manuals  describing  what projects  are
eligible  for assistance  by the  FFDU,  and explaining  the
specifications,  procedures  etc in relatively  simple  terms.Part C:  Cases
Introduction
47.  The previous  paragraphs  have concentrated  on individual
features  of MDFs/MDIs;  it has not provided  a comprehensive
picture  of any particular  programme.  It  may be useful
at this stage to give  a brief descriptions  of a sample
of MDFs which illustrate  a  wide difference  in  both
institutional  and financial  form.
Brazil:  Parana  State  Municipal  Capital  Improvement  Programme
48.  Parana  State  MCIP finances  urban infrastructure  and public
services  in 287  market towns  with populations  below
fifty thousand. Larger towns  and the  region  surrounding
the state  capital  are excluded.  The programme  aims to
compensate  the  more rural  municipalities  for a revenue
sharing  system (based  on the origins  of value added tax)
and a local tax  base which favour  larger  urban  centres,
and to counteract  pressures  for rural  urban  migration.
49.  A current  four  year programme  aims to disburse  $150m
through  the MCIP,  of which 65%  has been contributed  from
the State  budget  and 35% from  a World Bank  Loan.  The
World Bank Loan component  has  been on-lent  to  municipalities
which choose  to apply for loan finance  for  projects  forming
part of approved  multi-year  investment  programmes  and
which can meet statutory  debt service  requirements. The
State  Government  contribution  is in the form  of capital
grants  distributed  in two  ways:(i) 50:50 matching grants  to those municipalities  taking
sub loans under the programme
(ii) a per capita allocation  to all the eligible
municipalities with a slight weighting in favour
of areas of faster economic and urban population
growth.
50.  The anticipated distribution  of the current programme
is
- roads and bridges  43.3%
- water, sanitation  and electricity  10.5%
- miscellaneous  infrastructure  11.2%
- community  facilities  23.0%
- equipment and vehicles  7.0%
- technical assistance  5.0%
Specifications and criteria have been applied aiming at
wide diffusion of services, low cost and labour intensive
technologies and a bias to  low income  beneficiaries.
51.  The Fund has been administered by the State Economic
Planning Secretariat  (SEPL), but loans aredisbursed
and  recovered  by  the  Parana  State  Bank.  The  Bank  has
deducted  repayment  and  interest  from  the  municipal  shares
of the State's value  added tax  (ICM)  which are disbursed
through its accounts.  Appraisal  and supervision have
been provided by twenty SEPL regional offices.  Technical
assistance covering design, tendering and supervision
of works, preparation  of town zoning plans, cadastralregistration,  property  tax  assessment  and administration,
and accounting  practices  was meant to  be provided  by
two institutions:  The Parana  Municipal  Assistance
Foundation (FAMEPAR)  and the  Parana  State  Public  Works
Company (EMOPAR); -in  the event  it has proved  difficult
to negotiate  a satisfactory  programme  of service  by
these  agencies.
52.  Municipalities  have been expected  to repay the loan
elements  of the  programme  and to operate  and maintain
the investments  through  a series  of cost  recovery
measures  including
(i)  direct  charging  of beneficiaries  for  street
related  improvements
(ii)  user charges  for  services  and utilities
(iii)  improved  registration,  assessment  and
collection  of the urban  property  tax
(liability  for  which would be extended  to
new areas  by the investments  in infrastructure)
53.  The Capital  Improvement  Programme  was launched  in
1981,  but initially  on a purely  grant  basis.  The
revised  programme  including  the  World Bank participation
and the provision  of loans,  has effectively  been in
operation  since 1984.  A full  evaluation  has not been
made and  would in any case  be premature.  In particular
no evidence  is available  on the impact  of the  programme
on municipal  finance  or the implementation  of the cost
recovery  objectives.  As mentioned  there  have been longdelays in providing the technicAl assistance in this
particular  direction.  Nor is there evidence concerning
overall project quality.
54.  Where  the programme has apparently exceeded beyond
expectation  is in the diffusion of investment and in
changing the quality of state m'xnicipal  relations.  Only
50% of municipalities were expected to take up loans;
over 90% have done so.  Great pressure  is being exerted
by municipalities  on the State Government  to continue
the programme and, although the World Bank loan is
repayable by the MDF, there has been sufficient internal
generation  to turn it into a revolving fund.  State
funding has been transformed from a mechanism of ad hoc
patronage  to a formula set of allocations to which
municipalities  are entitled and within which investments
can be planned by them.  Average project costs have
been only $27,000;  there is evidence of widespread
community participation  and satisfaction created by the
unprecedented  access to funds on such a small and diffused
scale.
India:  Calcutta Municipal Development  Programme
55.  The Calcutta Metropolitan  area comprises two municipal
corporations,  37 municipalities  and 165 small peri-
urban authorities.  For twenty years  from 1960 onward
the central and state governments attempted, with
international  assistance,  to address the  chronic needsof the conurbAtion for planning and investment through
metro-wide  organisations  such as the Calcutta Metropolitan
Planning  Organisation and the Calcutta Metropolitan
Development  Authority,which  effectively  bi-passed this
extremely  fragmented system of municipal government.
56.  The weakness  of municipal government  and its lack of
participation  in the urban development programme created
increasing  problems, however,  in terms of the local
reticulation of major infrastructure,  its operation
and maintenance  and cost recovery.  A  Municipal
Development Programme has therefore been implemented in
the 1980s with several elements  including
- revised legislation governing  the constitution and
management of local bodies
- a  resumption of municipal elections
- creation of a central valuation board to supervise
and improve property  tax assessment
- secondment of technical staff to municipalities
- a revised grant structure  reforming the
provision of grants and loans for
both current and capital expenditure
57.  The revised grant structure provides grants for current
expenditure,which  are estimated  to close the gap between
operations and maintenance  expenditure  (including salaries
and debt seri~ice)  and current revenues from taxes, user
charges etc.  The "gaps" are calculated  in advance on thebasis not of actual budgets but of target levels which
assume
ti)  percantage  ceilings on the annual increases in
current spending
(ii)  progress  towards a 100% recovery of water  supply
costs through user charging
(iii)  specific increases in the assessed rateable
value of property  and in the percentages of
property tax demands and arrears collected
These grants are administered  through the Local Government
and Urban Development  Department of the West Bengal
State Government.  The targets have assumed that the
percentage  increases in municipal  revenue would outrun
the percentage  increases in expenditure, so that the
deficit grants would decrease  as a proportion  of current
revenue from 58% in 1983/4 to 40% by 1986/7, though of
course increasing  in absolute terms.
58.  The Municipal  Development Programme also provides a
mixture of grants and loans to municipalities  for
capital development purposes. The mix of grant  and loan
depends upon the nature of  the  project as explained  in
paragraph  30(2).  Project designs must fall within a
range of minimum and maximum standards and service
delivery norms  (illustrated at Appendix C).  The programme
envisaged disbursement  of $73m between 1983 and 1988,
on a range of investments including water supplies,
drainage, sanitation, slum improvement, parks,  crematoria,
transport infrastructure,  markets and community halls.The capital  grants/loans  Are administered  by the  Calcutta
Metropolitan  Development  Authority  as part of a total
investment  programme  in Calcutta  funded  by a mixture  of
resources  including
- Government  of India  budget  appropriations
- Government  of West Bengal  budget  appropriations
- IDA credits
- borrowing  from public  sector  financial  institutions
- 50% share  in octroi  receipts  within  the Calcutta
Metropolitan  area
The allocations  to individual  municipalities  have been
based  upon  population,  but with a minimum  of rupees  1 crore
per municipality  (approximately  $lm).
59.  The allocation  of current  budget  deficit  grants  and
capital  grants/loans  are linked  by two conditions
gi)  if municipalities  realise  a lower  deficit
than anticipated  in the  calculation  of their
deficit  grant,  the savings  in deficit  grant
are converted  into  an additional  capital
grant
(ii)  if  municipalities  realise  a larger  deficit
than  anticipated  in the  calculation  of their
grant,  the  gap will be bridged  by additional
deficit  grant  but at the expense  of an
equivalent  cut in their  capital  grant/loan
allocation.Performance  on expenditure  control,  cost  recovery  and
tax administration  is therefore  intended  to have a direct
impact  upon the size of local  investment  programmes.
60.  Again only interim  assessments  of achievement  are available.
Practical  problems  have arisen  in such  elements  as the
staffing  of state  bodies  concerned  with appraisal  and
monitoring,  or the installation  of the  water meters
necessary  to improve  user charging.  Massive litigation
over revised  property  tax assessments  (covering  one
third  of all assessments  by the Calcutta Municipal
Corporation)  has delayed  much of the  anticipated
increase  in rateable  value.  In  particular  the State
Government  has proved  reluctant  to  implement  the full
incentives  implicit  in the revised  grant structure;
cuts  have been postponed  so far in  capita  allocations
to  municipalities  exceeding  "target"  deficits  in current
budgets.  The numbers  of local  bodies  which have  managed
to confine  their  deficits  within  projected  limits  has
declined  from 22 in 1983/4  to 10  in 1985/6.
61.  Nevertheless  positive  achievements  seem  clear in at
least  two respects.  The first is the  quality  of
implementation  of capital  investment  through  the
municipalities.  Not only are infrastructural  improvements
being far more  widely  distributed  by municipal  participation,
but the supervision  of contractors  by local  elected
officials  has also  proved far  more effective;  local
accountability  in this respect  has  worked.  Secondlysignificant  improvement has occurred in the collection
efficiency  of local taxes and charges, even if their
assessment  base has fallen short of expectations.  The
Calcutta Municipal Corporation,  for example, achieved
it target of collecting  85% of current property  tax
demand  two years ahead of schedule, has introduced
graduated water  rates for domestic consumers and
increased  its tariff for industrial and commercial
consumers.
Jordan:  Cities and Villages Development Bank
62.  Jordan originally  operated a Municipalities  and Villages
Loans  Fund under the aegis of the Ministry of
Municipalities  and Rural Administration.  In 1979 it
was transformed by law into an autonomous Cities and
Village  Development  Bank.  The Bank was established
to provide investment  finance and assistance  to municipal
and village  councils,with  the object of promoting widely
distributed  access to infrastructure and employment.
63.  The Bank's share capital is subscribed by the Government,
the Central Bank of Jordan and the municipal and village
councils.  It is administered by a Board chaired by the
Minister of Municipalities  and Rural Administration,  but
the extremely capable general manager is largely
responsible  for its operation.64.  The CVDB disbursed  $14Qm in loans to municipal  and
village councils in its first five years and anticipated
lending a further $73m over the period 1985-88.  By the
beginning of 1985 equity and internally generated reserves
represented  40% of its funds;  the remaining 60% have
been contributed by municipal deposits, loans from the
Central  Bank, time deposits by financial institutions
and international  aid.
65.  Municipalities  and village councils in Jordan are financed
principally by  I
(i)  shares of nationally  collected taxes on petroleum,
imports and vehicle registration
(ii)  a property tax assessed and collected on behalf
of local government  by the Ministry  of Finance
(iii)  a variety of locally administered taxes and
user charges.
The national revenue shares and the property tax collections
are credited  to the accounts of municipal and village
councils with the CVDB, and loan repayments and interest
charges are debited directly  to these accounts.
66.  During  the first five years  two-thirds of CVDB lending
was used on road construction and land acquisition,
reflecting  the phenomenal  pace of urban
settlement during that period.  The balance was spent
orn  school buildings, water  supplies, sewerage, electrification,
clinics and revenue earning projects  (markets, workshops,rental office blocks, bus and taxi stations, car parks,
slaughter houses etc).  It has been anticipated that
commercially  focussed projects would occupy a grcater
proportion  of lending during the current phase, both
because much basic infrastructure has been provided
and because  the Government  has recently taken over
responsibility  for construction of schools and main
roads.
67.  The spread of urban physical and social infrastructure
(paved  roads,  schools, clinics, piped water, electricity
etc) to virtually all settlements, however small and
remote, has been a remarkable  feature of Jordan's
recent development, and more so considering  its rate of
urbanisation.  The CVDB has undoubtedly played a major
role both in financing this investment and in supervising its
quality through its criteria and  standards,  its appraisal
and monitoring.  It has developed a very positive
attitude  towards its client municipalities  and has taken
onanincreasingly  active role in general financial and
technical advice and training.
68.  The general impact of these operations on municipal
finance has been more equivocal.  Up to 1985 the only
financial  limitation on municipal borrowing was a
requirement  that debt service should not exceed 80%
of the annual shares of national revenues.  This secured
CVDB's ability to recover  loans from municipal revenues
passing through its accounts, but was a misleadingindication of municipal  capacity to borrow.  It over
estimated  the borrowing ability of smaller bodies highly
dependent  on revenue shares, and probably under-
estimated  that  of  larger  towns with substantial other
revenue  sources.  In 1985 fresh criteria  were substituted
which examined both the current  liquidity of individual
municipalities  and forecast the revenue surplus over
current expenditure  to which debt service  is in practice
charged.  The result was to expose a growing indebtedness
on the part of a number of municipalities,  and some slowing
down in the overall rate of CVDB lending.
Part D:  Discussion
Introduction
69.  How far do MDFs/MDIs meet the objectives and fulfil the
high expectations which uften surround them?  This raises
a series of questions which can only be answered  in a
very tentative way, given the rapid nature of this
survey and the incomplete experience of the recent round
of developments.
Should Municipalities  Borrow?
70.  MDFs transmit grants as well as loans and are concerned
with more than straight financial flows.  Nevertheless
loan finance is at the heart of virtually all MDF
operations.  Moreover  lending is central to the
ideology of a number of the recent MDF experiments.ProgrAmmes  such as those in  Mexico  and  Colombia  and
under negotiation  in Indonesia  positively  encourage
municipalities  to  borrow  more for  capital  investment
purposes.  One cannot  avoid the feeling  that the
international  development  banks  particularly  are wedded
by the  nature  of their  own operations  to a  belief that
borrowing  is the  right  way to finance  investment. Is
it?
71.  In discussing  this  question  a distinction  is normally
drawn  between  self liquidating  and non-self  liquidating
investments,  ie.  between those  which should  generate
extra revenue  to service  a loan and those  which do not
(at  least  not  directly).  In  fact  this  distinction  only
affects  part  of  the  argument  - whether  loan  finance  can
be  afforded.  Where  revenue  is  available  as an alternative
to  loans,  the  other  arguments  apply.
72.  To borrow  money for investment  which should  generate
revenue  is rarely  cortroversial  in itself.  There is
some  confusion,  however,over  the nature  and purpose  of
"self financing"  or "revenue  generating"  projects. They
can refer to services  which municipalities  conventionally
provide  or are expected  to  provide,  but for  which the
users are expected  to pay, e.g.  water supplies  or
commercial  refuse  collection.  These  are exprEcted  to
cover their costs.  They are not provided  in competition
with private  enterprise,  although  the alternative  of
providing  such services  through  franchises  may well be
available.73.  The terms can also refer to commercial operAtions  into
which mtunicipalities  enter, possibly in competition with
private enterprise,  and with  the object of making net
profits,  ie. of meeting costs and subsidising other
municipal  services.  MDFs do not usually draw the line
between  these two types of "revenue generating projects"
and often  indeed encourage the latter.  But borrowing
to invest in commercial operations  for a commercial
purpose is open to a number of questions.  Firstly,  is
municipal government  good at commercial operations?
Experience  is far from encouraging, and there are many
characteristics  of municipal  government which are
inimical to successful commercial operations  - some of
them justifiably so.  Secondly, should municipal
government be competing in areas open to private
enterprise?  Thirdly,  should commercial opportunism  be
a  substitute  for  an  equitable  system  of  taxation
(whether  through  local  taxation  or  transfers)  as  a
source  of  finance  for  public  goods?
74.  There is a case for municipalities  engaging  in investment
of a commercial  nature, where it will stimulate the growth
of the local economy - where  it will promote private
enterprise.  Industrial sites  and workshops,  joint
venture city centre redevelopment may be examples.  But
the prime motive of such investment should be the
contribution  to urban development, not revenue generation
per se.75.  Par greater argument surrounds  loan financing of nor.-
self liquidating  investment in main roads, clinics,
parks,  schools etc.  On the one hand it is often held
that.  loan finance effectively  imposes the costs of capital
development  on the future as well as current beneficiaries.
Moreover  it significantly accelerates the  pace of
investment;  if a municipality has revenue surplus
to its operational and maintenance  costs,  it can obtain
far more investment by using  this to service debt than by direct
capital expenditure. There  are a number of contrary
arguments.  Firstly the unfairness  of visiting full costs
on current beneficiaries  may be cancelled out by the
benefits they derive from investment by previous
generations.  Secondly, borrowing  as opposed to full
budgetary appropriation may breed irresponsibility,
with municipalities  undertaking projects or building  at
standards to which  they would  not give priority if the
full cost fell immediately on the taxpayer.  Instant
popularity may be pursued at the cost of overstraining
resources in the future.  There is the further macro
economic objection  that increasing public sector borrowing
is inimical to the wider economy because it encourages
inflation and "crowds out" investment in productive
enterprise,  (itself countered by the view that public
investment creates demand for private enterprise).  These
arguments tend to be resolved pragmatically.  Municipal
governments which have a buoyant tax and transfer base
tend tc finance capital expenditure  largely from revenue;
those which do not rely heavily on loan finance.76.  MDFs can,  however,  be defended  against  the standard
criticisms  of loan finance  on'  if they  apply
(1)  a sound system  of financial  forecasts  to judge
the  capacity  of municipalities  to take  on
additional  debt;
(2) rational  criteria  for defining  and  assessing  the
I
types  of investment  eligible  for  their support.
Do municipalities  need a public  sector  credit  institution?
77.  Given that  municipalities  are justified  in  borrowing
mooney  for capital  investment,  do they  need a source
of credit  in the  public  sector?  Why cannot  they rely
on the commercial  banking  system?
78.  Commercial  and public  sector  credit  are not,  of course,
mutually  exclusive.  Local government  in Western  Europe
borrows  from private  financial  institutions  as  well as
from  MDIs.  MDIs borrow  from the financial  institutions,
predominantly  so in Western  Europe.  Credit  may well
be packaged,  as in the  Colombian  case  where the  MDF is
used to discount  varying  proportions  (but  never all) of
commercial  bank lending.
79.  If  municipalities  were dependent  directly  and  entirely
upon the financial  markets,  it is  unlikely  that they
would have equal access  to loan  finance.  Smaller,
poorer,  more remote  municipalities  would probably  have
more difficulty  in  borrowing  and pay  more heavily  for it.
This would be contrary  to national  policies  of social
equity  or physical  decentralisation.80.  Moreover  private financial institutions are unlikely to
be concerned  to provide the degree of technical appraisal
and support of which MDIs are capable.  They might be
concerned  to assess the financial viability of self-
liquidating  investments or the general repayment capacity
of municipalities  in the case of other projects;  indeed
they should be more concerned than public sector MDIs
which  are secured by liens on transfers rather than
local revenues.  But traditional banking
disciplines  have been considerably undermined by the
liquidity of recent years and in practice there is just as much
danger of irresponsible  levels of lending by the private
financial institutions.
Have MDFs/MDIs  increased resources for urban investment?
81.  The varying scale of investment  financed by MDFs is
reflected  in the following sample figures:
Countrv  und  Y?ea  Investment
Per  CauLta
$ _a
selgium  MunLcipal  Credit  a*nk  1983  112.0
fira,il  Parana  State  Help  1983-86  (forecast)  18.8
Santa  Catarina  State  MOP  1986-93  (forecast)  4.1
Salvador  IPZRC1  1986-94  (forecast)  7.0
Colombia  "TOU  1987-90  (forecast)  6.7
Denmark  Municipal  Credit  Institution  1983  17.8
trance  Deposit  and  Consigament  Bank 1983  101.0
Germany  German  Municipal  Sank  1992  32.0
India  Calcutta  tA  1983-88  (forecast)  2.0
Italy  Deposit  and  Credit  Bank  1983  42.2
Japan  finance  Corporation  of
Local  Public  Enterprisem  1983  42.5
Jordan  CVD9  1987  (forecast)  14.3
Mexico  *ASOBRAS  1984  2.3
Norway  Municipal  Bank
municipal  tension  lundt  1985  73.0
Pakistan  Lanual  Development  programme  1984-8S  2.3
Paraguay  1D4  1980  0.5
SpaLn  Local  Credit  lank  1983  8.0
Tuisia  CPSCL  1984  0.482.  These  figures indicate the massive scale of municipal
investment  financed by some European MDIs.  In 1983
MDIs  lent 46 billion francs to local authorities in France,
3,979 billion  lira in Italy.  They financed 80% of local
authority  investment  in Belgium,  35% in the Netherlands.
This scale of operation reflects the wide range of local
government  responsibilities  in Western Europe, the
established  practices of loan financing and the strength
of municipal  ability to service debt.  It also reflects
the strength of the capital markets since this lending
was predominantly  financed through the MDIs by private
funds and savings.  But the MDIs'  access to these markets
reflected  the scale and security of local government  finance.
83.  Clearly the third world MDFs are operating generally on a
far more modest scale.  The basic conditions are so much
more restricted  - the range and scale of municipal
investment,  the local revenue base,  the capital market.
Some extra  funds have been extracted from central
government  as initial capital,  as counterpart funds for
international  aid or for reimbursing  foreign loans where
these have been capitalised  in the MDF.  Much central
government  investment in MDFs,  however, is simply a
re-routing  of existing capital outlays or transfers.
84.  Capital markets have been tapped by third world MDIs,
but mainly  those markets under public control.  This has
not been without problems.  Where  the MDI is itself acustodian of insur4nce/pens.on/savings  funds some conflicts
of interest can arise.  Lending for long term investment
may  not always be compatible with trustee commitments
liable to unpredictable  cash flow fluctuations, particularly
those sensitive  to economic  changes.  The Brazilian
Housing Bank has apparently been an  acute victim of
this problem.  Where MDIs  have developed relatively
stable turnovers and diversified portfolios,  such risks
are less acute.
85.  As mentioned  at the outset, the larger source of
increased  resources implicit in most MDF objectives
is local government  itself - through counterpart funds,
through  debt  service  and  operations  and  maintenance
obligations,  and  through  the  various  cost  recovery
measures  built into conditions  or specifications of
loans. Has  this been achieved?
86.  Pirie Gall, appraising the US AID assistance  to Latin
American  MDIs in the 1970s was pessimistic.  "Municipalities
frequently seem in worse  financial condition under MDI
lending programmes.  We did not find that programmes
rewarded efforts at local financing, but provided  a
substitute  for this"tl).  The recent round of development
has undoubtedly  attempted  to do better, but the evidence
of achievement  is not clear.  It has to be said frankly,
that, with one or two exceptions  such as the Calcutta
programme,  donors do not appear  to follow up the cost
reccvery condition of loans in any systematic way.  In
(1)  Pirie M Gall  'Municipal Development  Programme in Latin
America",  (Praeger, 1976)the majority  of cases the MDI ijs  recovering  its loans
directly  from transfers so that its own viability  and
debt service are not conditioned by the cost recovery
efficiency  of its clients.  The  financial strain on
Jordanian  authorities, for example, only surfaced when
ability to sustain a further round of borrowing came into
issue.
87.  In a number of cases e.g. Colombia, Mexico and Turkey,
enhanced MDF operation has  coincided with major reforms
of the local revenue base, normally associated with
revenue sharing.  The local authorities  have not been
dependent  upon enhanced  local charging or taxing to
sustain the debt and maintain  facilities.  In others,
some improvements  in registration of tax payers/
consumers &nd collection  efficiency  have been achieved.
Making more people pay what they already should pay,is an
administratively  and politically  feasible goal.  Less
success has attended efforts to make people pay more
- to update property  tax.assessments,  increase tariffs
etc.  Revaluations have been carried out in parts of
the Philippines  and Thailand,for  example,but their
implementation  postponed.  Colombia enacted strict
requirements for indexing property tax values, but they
have been very partially  implemented.  Central governments
have been as much in default in this respect as the
municipalities.88.  A  basic  problem  is  that  so  far  s  the  taxation  elements
of  cost  recovery  are  concerned,  MDF programmes  have
tended  to  focus  narrowly  on  the  property  tax.  There  are
fundamental problems  in getting the most politically
exposed of all tiers of government  to exploit the most
politically  sensitive of all taxes, which are not going
to be overcome  simply by the incentives of a loan or
a dollop of technical assistance.  Moreover  in times
of austerity when governments  are having to make unpopular
cuts in public expenditure, subsidies etc, they do not
want to add insult to injury by harassing people for more
property  tax.  It simply is not high on anyone's
political  agenda.
Have MDFs/MDIs  improved the utilisation  of resources?
89.  MDFs are not completely proof agains political  chicanery
or bad judgement.  Political pressure has bounced  Funds
into unsound  investment.  The Moroccan FEC has been
seriously undermined,  for example, by default on major
loans to the Casablanca  transport undertakings which
were forced on it.  One  Kenya  council  obtained a loan
from the  Local Government LoarEAuthority  in one day
by applying to the Minister  in person  through a good will
mission.
90.  Misallocation  has resulted  too from central technocrats
using MDFs to finance investment on their own pet schemes,
which municipalities  have been reluctant to pay for,
utilise or maintain.  Pirie Gall applied this criticism
to water  supplies constructed by some of the LatinAmerican  Institutes and handed over to municipalities  for
maintenance  and debt service.  The Indonesian market  loan
programme  (Inpres Pasar) suffered from central targetry
which  ignored any local assessment of needs.  The Cameroon
FEICOMinvested  heavily in public works machinery  for leasing,
which municipalities  did not want, could not afford and
have neither used nor maintained.
91.  But lessons have been  learned and the record of recent
M4DF  programmes  Las been better.  Rationalisation  of
central government  financial flows was a major  objective
of a number of these programmes,  particularly in Latin
America - both as to distribution  and purpose of
investment.  Moreover  municipal initiative  in choice and
execution of investment  has been given far greater
emphasis.
92.  All the cases described  in Part C illustrate  the ability
of MDFs to finance a wide range of small  scale and
geographically  diffused  investments.  This is a welcome
contrast  to the nature of most nationally andinternationally
financed investment, and might  facetiously be called  the
Heineken  Factor.  To see the standard of infrastructure
in a remote Jordanian village is to believe.
93.  This diffusion has of course put a strain on the ability
of MDIs to appraise the projects  they are financing.
The adoption of sound specifications with minimum andmaximum  standards seems important in guiding municipal
planners,  speeding processing  and relieving strain on the
MDF staff.  Demanding  the preparation of comprehensive
multi-year  investment plans as a prerequisite  for project
finance is  of  more dubious  utility.  Whether it has
improved municipal  planning is unclear;  much of the
work tends to be done by central planners and consultants;
it certainly  slows down implementation.
Are MDFs better managed by an autonomous institution?
94.  Autonomous  MDIs have a number of hypothetical advantages.
It is hoped  that they will be immune  from political
pressure,  and more disciplined  in allocating funds
between municipalities,  in appraising projects  and in
exacting recovery of loans.
95.  In practice  these advantages are not proven.  Both
autonomous  agencies and government  secretariats have
shown themselves  capable or incapable of disciplined
performance  in these respects.  A municipal bank in
Honduras,  a "window" within  the Moroccan  Casse de
Depots  and the Kenyan Ministry of Local Government  have
all failed to recover defaulting  loans.  A municipal
bank in Jordan, a state government  secretariat in
Brazil, a metropolitan  development authority in India
have successfully channelled  investments to small projects
as described  in Part C.96.  An autonomous  institution  should  of course  be more
concerned  about the financial  viability  of its  borrowers
and their  projects.  This  has  not necessarily  been the
case.  There are several  reasons.  As already  mentioned,
MDIs are often able to recover  loans  from transfers. Most
of them undertake  municipal lending  as part of  wider
operations;  default  by municipalities  may be covered
by other revenue  sources  - shares  of taxes,for  example,
or custody  of state  controlled  funds.  MDIs are not
necessarily  under great obligation  to their  own funders,
particularly  where initial  capital  is not repayable  and
is supposed to  "revolve".
97.  Another  hope of autonomous  MDIs is that they  will attract
energetic,  able  professional  staff,  who are  positive
and sympathetic  in their attitudes  to  municipal  clients.
The Ministries  of Local Government  are  often preoccupied
with the politics  of central/local  relations; they have
often been unattractive  places  of employment  for
professionally  qualified  and ambitious  staff;  their
attitudes  are often unduly  paternalistic  or legalistic,
insufficiently  supportive  or promotional.
98.  Some success  has been achieved  in this  direction.  The
CVDB, for  example,  has seventy  established  staff.  One
third are graduates,  the  majority  under  forty,  half
female (at  all  grades).  The Technical  Department
employs  ten engineers,  five financial  analysts  and
three  economists. Pirie Gall writes  of Latin  America"the MDIs have succeeded in attracting well-motivated,
well-trained  individuals, most  of them young and
energetic,  in the fields of engineering, project economics
and public administration"  (2).
99.  The problem is maintaining  the motivation  of capable
staff and the positive  ethos  of the organisation
as a whole.  For all the theory and the experience
indicate  that while individuals may be  altruistic,
organisations  are inherently  self-interested.  This is
all too often  illustrated in the  behaviour  of MDIs.
Financial managers have been preoccupied with turning
over the money, the engineers with building water  supplies
etc for municipalities  to maintain,  the planners and
architects with devising plans  for municipalities  to
execute.  The real promotion  of municipal autonomy
and capacity  gets lost in this preoccupation with the
projects, with the disbursements  and repayments,  the
rates of return which  satisfy the image and ambitions
of the MDI as an entity and its staff as individuals.
100. The ideal role  conjured up for MDIs is essentially
pro-active  and promotional.  Can an organisation be
expected  to sustain this character into institutional
and individual middle age?  This brings us to the
crucial issue of accountability.
(2)  op citHow can performance  and accountabilitty  be sustained?
101. The record of third world  MDFs and MDIs tends to be one
of fits and starts.  Governments  have bouts of commitment
to decentralisation  and munici,,i  development, and MDFs
are funded and staffed with enthusiasm.  But then an
electoral  reverse, an economic crisis, a drought changes
the priorities;  forms remain but not the commitment.
Donors support an MDI;  the attention they bestow and the
resources they contribute enhance motivation;  their
policing  helps the staff resist political pressures  to
deviate from stated objectives  and professional  norms.
But the aid moves on, the pressures return, the glamour
recedes, the momentum  is lost;  self-preservation takes
over.
102. The other problem is the organisational version of the
Peter Principle.  An MDI gets a reputation  for achievement
in what is a difficult  field.  Immediately governments
and donors home in with more resources or fresh tasks.
Capacity becomes over-burdened  and performance slips.
103. How can performance be sustained?  It is worthwhile
looking again at the European  MDIs, not as an ideal,
but because they have stayed the course.  Three  points
may be relevant.  Firstly,  they are all in some degree
of competition for funds and borrowers.  They are
having to compete to obtain deposits or sell bonds
with other financial institutions.  They are not the
only source of loan finance for municipal government.They have to be accountable  to both lenders and borrowers
to maintain  their position.
104. Secondly, they are acting as true intermediaries between funds
and individuals looking for investment outlets and municipalities
able and willing  to borrow.  The role is less demanding
in some senses than that of a third world MDI which can
only fulfil its objectives by a constantly pro-active
stance - fighting for a share of investment funds,
fighting  to maintain  and improve programme performance,
and often  swimming against a political tide in both
respects.
105. Thirdly, MDIs in Western Europe are more client driven,
because the municipal customers are less dependent both in
fact,  and  in self image,  and more self confident, more
securely resourced.
106. Ultimately  it is only the strength of municipal
government which  can guarantee the sustained effectiveness
of an MDF/MDI,  not the reverse.  A number of features are
important to this.  One is the electoral process. Without
being unrealistically  pious  about grass roots democracy,
one has to recognise that the accountability of local
government  is dependent upon elections.  One can no
more expect a local government  to run effectively under
appointed administrators or party nominees  (as is so
often the case) than one can expect a  petrol engine
to run smoothly on diesel.  One major reason why the
municipal  development programme  is  showing results inCalcutta  is because mayors and councillors are once
again elected after years of supersession.  One major
reason for the success of a programme like the Parana
State Capital  Improvement Programme is the existence of
mayoral elections.  But electing  officials is not enough;
they have to be in office  long enough  to take some
responsibility  for their actions.  Bi-annual elections
without provision  for re-election, as practiced in some
Latin American  countries, does not promote accountability.
107. The second prerequisite  for stronger municipal clientele
is a sound current revenue base. It is worth  noting that
transfers  feature prominently  in financing most Western
European  municipal  systems,  and that local taxation,
though important in most countries,  is basically on
income or expenditure  rather than property.  If management
programmes  are to focus on promoting  the current revenue
base, a more catholic attitude  to both tax sources and the
role of recurrent transfers  is necessary.
108. The third point  is that municipal  government  in much of
Western Europe  is operating  from a far ztronger  local
economic base.  Appendix D  is a quotation fr*m Pirie Gall's
appraisal of Latin America MDFs.  It argues that much
MDF investment  does not address the fundamental
backwardness  which causes  the weakness and inertia of
municipal  government.  This extract is included because
it is challenging,  not because  it is wholly  true.  It
probably underestimates  the contribution whichmunicipal  infrastructure  zp4kes  to local  economic
development,  and the knock-on  effects  which a.  highly
participative  programme  can have on local  self-
confidence  and,therefore,enterprise. Nevertheless
the concern  of governments  and donors  with urban development
has  iacked  the attention  to the  productive  base which
has characterised  rural  investment.
109.  This is to argue that the sustained,  lasting  strength
of an MDF is dependent  on the  strength  of local  government,
and not the reverse.  Accountability  to the
municipal  client  is critical.  But if  municipal
development  is really  dependent  upon a  wider set of
political,  financial  and economic  factors  which are largely
independent  of MDF operations,  this  does not mean that
those  operations  do not contribute  to it.  Routing
more investment  through  local  government,  exercising
its  capacity  for programme  choice  and supervision,
reversing  the  pattern  of denmand,  all  help to build up
the self-confidence  in  municipal  government,  as well
as enhancing  the  physical  and social  plant  which local
people  and businesses  enjoy.  This can be a frustrating
process  because central  government  often  has vested
interests  in maintaining  patronage,  and local  leaders
may find safety  in continuing  the dependent  role.  But
restoring  the  effectiveness  of local  government  is  basically
a matter  of reviving  its accountability  and self-esteem;
persistence  by MDIs, governments  and  donors  is justified
and necessary.APPENDIX  A
COUNTRY 
FUND  ADMINISTERING 




AUSTRIA  Zentralsparkasse 
Central  Savings  Loan  Private  Savings  Deposits  Social,  Cultural
und  Kommerzial  Bank, 




Deposits  by Financial  Promotion
Institutions
BELGIUM  Credit  Communal 




BOLIVIA  SENDU  (National  Urban 
Municipal  Loans  Foreign  Loans  Training




BRAZIL:  Municipal  Capital  SEPL  State  Planning  Loans  State Government 
Project  Design
Parana  Improvement 
Secretariat  Grants  Grant 
Tendering
State  Programme 
(Formula 
Town  Planning
and matching)  Foreign  Loan  Cadastral  Survey
Salvador  FEREM  (Metropolitan  CONDER  Metropolitan  Loans  State  Government 
Project  Design
Met  Region  Development  Fund) 
Development 




Santa  Municipal  Development  GAPLAN  State  Planning  Loans  State  Government  Grant  Project  Design
Catarina  Fund 
Secretariat  Grants  Foreign  Loan
State 





CAMEROON  Fonds  Special  Caisse  de Prets  Central  Deposit  Grants  10% share  of local taxes  Municipal  Training
d'Equipement  et 
Bank  (defacto)  Government  Grant  Equipment  Leasing
d'  Intervention
Intercommunal  (FEICOM)
CANADA:  Alberta Municipal 
Municipal  Loans  Provincial  and  Municipal
Alberta  Financial  Corporation 
Credit  Bank 
Share Capital
Province
BondsCOLOMBIA  Fondo Financiero  Banco  Central  Central  Discounting  Government  Grant
de Desarrollo  Urban  Hipotecario  Mortgage  Bank  Loans by
(FFDU)  (BCH)  Commercial  BCH  and Central
Banks  Bank Credits
Bonds
Foreiga  Loans
COSTA  RICA  Instituto  de  Municipal  Loans  Sovernment  Grant  Cadastral  Survey
Fomento  y Asesoria  Development  Revenue  Shares  Central  Purchasin,
Municipal  Institute  Bonds  Municipal  Trainin,
(IFAM)  Foreign  Loans
DENMARK  Kreditforeningen  Municipal  Loans  Bonds
af Kommuner  i Danmark  Credit  Bank
DOMINTCAN  Liga Municipal  Association  of  Loans  Government  Grant  Municipal  Trainin
REPUBLIC  Dominicana  Municipalities  Town  Planning
FRANCE  Caisse  des  Depots  Central  Loans  Reserves  of Postal  and
et Consignations  Deposit  Bank  Local Savings  Banks
GERMANY:  Deutsche  Girozentrale  Central  Loans  Reserves  of
Federal  Deutsche  Kommunalbank  Municipal  and  Municipal  Savings  Banks
Republic  Savings  Banks
GUATEMALA  Instituto  de  Fomento  Municipal  Loans  Government  Grant  Public Works
Municipal  Development  Revenue  Shares  Design  & Executio
(INFOM)  Institute  Bonds
Foreign  Loans  Central  Purchasin
Town  Planning
HONDURAS  Banco  Municipal  Municipal  Loans  Government  Grant  Project  Design
Autonomo  de  Deposit  and  Municipal  Deposits  Financial  Trainin
Honduras  Credit  Bank  (5% of Revenue)
(BANMA)  Bonds
Foreign  Loans
INDIA:  Fund  Assigned  to  Calcutta  Metropolitan  Loans  Federal/State  Government  Project  Design
Calcutta  Municipalities  Metropolitan  Development  Grants  Grants
MDA  (FAN)  Development  Agency  Revenue  Share  (Octroi)
Authority  Bond  Issues  (to Public
Sector  Institutions)Kerala  Kerala Urban  Municipal  Loans  Municipal  Deposits
State  Development  Finance  Credit  Bank
Corporation
Tamil  Nadu  Municipal  Development  State  Loans  State Government  Grant
State  Fund  Government  (Foreign  Loan  under
negotiation)
All-India  Life  Insurance  National  Loans  Re-insurance  Premia
Corporation  Corporation
ISRAEL  Bank  for  Israeli  Municipal  Loans  Government  Loans
Local  Authorities  Credit  Bank  Bank  Loans
Municipal  and  Private
Share  Capital
ITALY  Cassa  Depositi  Central  Savings  Loans  Postal  Savings  Deposits
e Prestiti  Bank  Stock  Issues
JAPAN  Finance  Corporation  Municipal  Loans  Bonds
for Municipal.  Credit  Bank
Enterprises  Deposits  by Financial
Institutions
JORDAN  Cities  and Villages  Municipal  Loans  Government  Share  Capital  Municipal  Trainlir
Development  Bank  Deposit  and  Bonds
Credit  Bank
Municipal  Deposits  and
Share  Capital




KENYA  Local Government  Ministry  of  Loans  Government  Grant
Loans Authority  Local Government  Local  Authority  Deposits
Foreign  Loans
MEXICO  sanco  Nacional  de  National  Public  Loans  Government  Grant  Municipal  Traini.
Obras  y Servicios  Works  Bank  Bonds
Publicos  Matching  Loans
(BANOBRAS)  Grants  Deposits
Foreign  LoansMOROCCO  Fonds d'Equipement  Caisse  de Depot  National  Deposit  Loans  Government  Grant
Communal  (FEC)  et de Gestion  Bank  Bonds
(CDG)  Central  Bank  Loans
National  Insurance  Deposits
NETHERLANDS  Bank  voor  Municipal  Credit  Loans  Municipal  Deposits
Nedulandache  and  Deposit  Bonds
Gemeenten  Bank
NICARAGUA  Secretaria  de  Fondo  Especial  National  Loans  Government  Grant
Asuntos  de Desarrollo  Development  Foreign  Loans
Municipales  (FED)  Bank
(SAMU)
NIGER  Caisse  de Prets  Credit  de Niger  Central  Bank  Loans  Government  Grant
aux  Collectivites  Share  of Local  Taxes  (3%)
Locales  (CPCL)
NORWAY  Rommunal  Municipal  Loans  Municipal  Employees'
Landspensjonskasse  Pensions  Fund  Pension  Contributions
Norges  Kommunalbank  Municipal  Loans  Bonds
Credit  Bank
PAKISTAN  Annual  Development  Federal  and  Loans  Government  Loan
Programme  Province  Govts  (by domestic  borrowing)
PANAMA  Municipal  Central  Bank  Loans  Government  t?)
Development  Fund  Foreign  Loans
PARAGUAY  Institute  de Desarrollo  Municipal  Loans  Government  Grant  Project  Design
Municipal  Development  Municipal  Training
(IDM)  Institute  Revenue  Shares
(national  and  local)
Foreign  Loans
PHILIPPINES  Municipal  Ministries  of  Loans  Foreign  Loan  Municipal  Training
Development  Fund  Finance  and  Public  (with matching
Works  and  Housing  expenditure  by
government)
PORTUGAL  Caisia  Geral  Central  Loans  Public  Agency  Deposits
e Deposito  Savings  Bank  Private  Savings  DepositsSENEGAL  Ponds d'Equipement  National  Grants  Government Grants
des Collectivites  Housing Bank  (Loan scheme  (Foreign Loan under
Locales (FECL)  (BHS)  in  negotiation)
preparation)
SPAIN  Banco de Credito  Municipal  Loans  Government Loans
Local de Espana  Credit Bank
SRI LANKA  Local Government  Ministry of  Loans  Government Grant/Loan
Loans Fund  Local Government
SWEDEN  Xommunkredit  Association  Loans  Bonds
of Local
Savings Banks
Kommunlaneinstitutet  Municipal  Loans  Bonds
Credit Bank
TANZANIA  Local Government  Ministry of  Loans  Government Grant
Loans Board  Local Government
THAILAND  Municipal  Department of  Ministry of  Loans  Deposits of Municipal
Development Funds  Local  the Interior  Revenue Surplus
Administration
TUNISIA  Caisse de Pret et  Banque de  National  Loans  Government Grant
de Soutien des  Developpement  Development  National Revenue Shares
Collectivites  Economique de  Bank
Locales (CPSCL)  Tunisie
(BDET)
TURKEY  Iller Bank  Central Credit  Loans  National Revenue Shares  Design and
and Public  Government Grants  Execution of
Works Agency for  Public Works
Provinces and
Municipalities
UGANDA  Local Authorities  Ministry of  Loans  Government Grant
Loans Fund  Local Government
UNITED  Public Works  Municipal  Loans  Government Borrowing
KINGDOM  Loans Board  Credit Agency  (through National
Loans Fund)VENEZUELA  Fundacion  para el  Municipal  Loans  Government  Grant  Design  and
Desarrollo  de la  Development  Foreign  Loans  Execution  of






ZAMBIA  Local  Authorities  Ministry  of  Loans  Government  Grant
Loans  Fund  Local  Government
ZIMBABWE  General  Development  Ministry  of  Loans  Government  Grant/Loan  (7)
Loan  Fund  Local  Government
and Town  PlanningAPPENDIX  B
NUNICIPAL  DEVELOPMENT  FUNDS - SOURCES OF FINANCING
(excluding  funds generated by lending operations)
1.  Grant from Central Government:  Cameroons, Columbia Dominican
Republic,  Costa Rica,  Guatemala,  Honduras, India (Calcutta
MDA),  Kenya,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Nicaragua, Niger, Paraguay,
Senegal, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela,  Zambia.
2.  Loans  from Central Government:  Israel,  Mexico,  Pakistan,
Spain,  Zimbabwe.
3.  Foundation  Grant from Central Government:  Norway.
4.  Grants  from  State Governments:  Brazil (Parana  and  Santa
Catarina).
5.  Share Capital Contributed by
(1)  Central Government:  Japan
(2)  Central  and  Local  Government:  Jordan,  Mexico,
Netherlands,  Spain
(3)  Provincial  and  Local  Government:  Belgium,  Canada
(Alberta)
(4)  Local Government:  Turkey
(5)  Local  Government  as a percentage of  annual  revenues:
Honduras
(6)  Private  investors  as  well  as  central  and  local
government:  Israel, Mexico.
6.  Deposits of Reserves  and Working Balances:
(1)  Central Government  Agencies:  France, Italy, Portugal
(2)  Local Governments:  Belgium,  Honduras, Jordan, Kenya
(3)  Local  Governments  (as a fixed percentage of revenues or
surplus):  Niger, Paraguay, Thailand, Turkey
7.  Deposits  of  Private  Savings Received  by  the  Institution
itself:  Austria, Belgium, Mexico.
8.  Deposits of Postal Savings Banks:  France and Italy.
9.  Deposits  of  Reserves  of National/Local  Savings  Banks  and
Insurance  Funds:  Canada  (Alberta),  France,  India  (LIC),
Italy, Morocco, Portugal, West Germany.
10.  Deposits  by  borrowers  of  a  fixed  percentage  of  loans:
Belgium, Denmark.
11.  Proceeds  (or shares) of specific national or local taxes:
Brazil  (Salvador):  Federal Participation Funds  and
Fuel Tax
Cameroons:  Capitation  Tax,  Patente,
Licences  (5%)
Costa Rica:  Liquor Taxes
Guatemala:  Liquor Taxes
India (Calcutta MDA):  Octroi (50%)
1Paraguay:  Real  Estate  Tax  (10%)  and
Liquor  Tax
Tunisia:  National  Taxes included  in the
Municipal  Fund (FCCL)
Turkey:  All National  Taxes (3%  share).
Consumption  Tax (5%).
12.  Loans  from  Banks:  Brazil  (Salvador),  Jordan,  Mexico,
Morocco.
13.  Loans from International/Bilateral  Agencies: Bolivia,  Brazil
(Parana, Salvador,  Santa  Catarina), Columbia, Costa Rica,
Guatemala,  Honduras,  India (Calcutta  MDA),  Jordan, Kenya,
Mexico,  Morocco,  Nicaragua,  Panama,  Paraguay,  Philippines,
Senegal,  Venezuela.
14.  Bonds/Debentures/Time  Deposits  subscribed by  financial
institutions  and private  investors: Austria,  Belgium,  Canada
(Alberta),  Columbia,  Denmark,  Honduras,  India (Calcutta  MDA),
Italy,  Japan,  Jordan,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Netherlands,  Norway,
Sweden,  United  Kingdom (through  the National  Loans Fund).
15.  Pension  Contributions of  Municipal  Employees:  Denmark,
Norway.
2APPENDIX  C
CALCUTTA  MUNICIPAL  DEVELOPMENT  PROGRAMME
SECTOR  SERVICE  DELIVERY  NORMS
These  norms,  drawn  up oy  CMDA  and the  municipalities,  ire  intended
to  reflect  the  minimum  needs  focus  of  the  program.
Sector  Subproject  Service  Dellvery  Norms
Component  Minimum  Maximum
Water  Supply  5  gpcd.  25  gpcee.
Drainage  component  specific:  component  specific:
waterlogging  per  X  vaterlogging  per  100%
target  population  target  population
Servlce  Privy  1  comiunal  privy  I  comuunal  privy
Conversion  25  population  10  population
oItA  WJaste  component  specific:  compolkertt  specific:
management  tons  collected  per  tons  collecte4  per
target  population  100%  target  population
Local  Road  target  pcpulation  target  population
Improvemnts  within  20 minutes  within  5  minutes
walk  of  nearest  walk  of  nearest
metallic  road  metallic  road
Bustee  Improvements  component  eppciric  municipal  service
municipal  service  Improvements  per 100%
improvements  per  X  target  population
target  population
Markets  provision  of  50  sq.ft.  provision  of  600  sq.ft.
covered  space/1,000  covered  space/1,000
people  people
Parks  & Playgrounds  basic  improvements  to  basic  improvements  to
existlng  facilities  existlng  facilities,
provlsion  of  additional
park-playground  areas
Cremation  Grounds  maintenance  of  current  provision  of  hygienic
facilities  facilities  for
disposal  of  bodlesM  SICAL  DESICN  STAtNADS  FORt  THE  %DP
Sector  Subproject/  Phyoical  Dealmx Stearda
Coeponent  n  *ua  Haxsis
Water  Supply  secondary  grid
GveptratadPglsn ifF  n-  connected  to  pimary
secondary  distribution  grid;  house  connection
:ystem$  provilton  of
standpipes  for  m
dieersed oulation
Drainage  unlined  surface  drains  eurface  draine  with
concrete  slob  covering
at critical  locations
Service  privy  sanitary  latrines  to  sanitary  latrines
conversion.  seat  level  only  With  Superstructure
Solid  Waste  had  cart  end  tricycle  rickahaws/
management  intermediate  VAT  transfer  *tatione  for
collection.  final  primary  collection.
dieposal  by  Tractor  trailers  to
trailer  truck  final  disposal  or
secondary  transfer
stations  ;  pilot
couposting  plants
Local  Road  briek  paved roads  black  topped  metallic
toprovexents  roads  procected
against  erosion
hustee  improvements  provision  of  shallow  provision  of  water
tubewells,  street  tape  and standpipae,
lighting.  open  intermediate  vats  for
surface  drainage,  solid  waste collection,
comreal sa*ntary  open surface  dtcinege,
latrines,  brick  commnoal  sanitary
paved pathwayu  latrines,  brick  paved
pathways
Nsrkets  tubular  structure  with  concrete  structure
asbestos  roofing  and  with  some  services
brick  paved flooring,  as  mtniowm  standard
water  supply,  solid  but  also  with
waste  collection,  provision  of  parking
lightintg  open  spaces
drainage,  brlck  paved
circulation  system
Parke  & Playgrounds  wtre  fLncing;  brick  wall  or  ratal
basic  *eating  boundary fence,  basic
seating,  basic  play
facilities
Cremation  Crounds  proper  boundary  wall  proper  boundary  wall
to  ground  and  covered  area for
mourners
Notes: The  above  standards  wore  agreed  by  CQDA  In  discueston  with
ths  municipalittes.  It  ti  the  Intention  that  all o  nicipal  subprejecta
ihould  fall  within  the  range  of  standarde  prepared  for  each  sector.
Differences  in  design  standards  between  mwuicipalities  (e.g.,  water  supply)
reflect  Ci)  differenesm  (quallty  of  groundwater,  density  of population,
etc.);  (ii)  aveilability  of  necessary  transaunicipal  infrastructure  (e.g.-
primary  distribution  system),  and  (i11)  sector  priorities  of  the
maniciplSities  themselves.APPENDIX  D
Extracts  from  Pirie  Gall
"Municipal  Development  Programs  in Latin  America"
(Praeger  1976,  pages  55-57)
The Economic  Growth Element  in Municipal  Development*
The best tax system in the world will yield little from a stagnant  or declining
economy, and this applies at the local level no less than at the national. In our
view, insufficient attention has been paid to this basic reality in the municipal
development  programs,  and this represents  a major  flaw that should be rectified
if the municipalities  are to move to a more comprehensive  developmental  role.
The current programs have not yet moved to the next stage of linking  public
investment to incentives  for industrial (including  agroindustrial),  tourism, mar-
keting, and other enterprises that would provide  new income  to the population,
and by derivation,  new  revenues  to the municipalities.
The investor, whether private or  public, looks for economic factors to be
provided by local governments,  such as water, sewer, and power of industrial
scale; refuse collection capable of handling  massive  amounts of waste;  access  to
major transportation networks and markets; and land located and prepared to
suit his nueds. In addition, of course, the investor  needs  labor and raw materials,
which may be found locally or imported  if other factors compensate.
Until economic factors are effected by local action (in collaboration with
national plans and operations), the municipalities  will continue to exhibit the
universal  problems of weak finances,  unskilled  and undermotivated  administra-
tion, and physical  unattractiveness. Installing  minor public works, new  tax and
accounting systems, and administrative  reorganization  will be but marginal  im-
provements  and of little lasting value  or fundamental  development  impact with-
out a reorientation or expansion of the scope of the effort toward economic
concerns.
The type and scale of public works  being  carried  out by the municipalities  with
MDI assistance  do not, in their present  form, have  much impact on the econom-
ic factors.  On close examination of the subprojects,  as reflected in Table 2.2
*See  Appendix  A, example  S.56  MUNICIPAL  DEVELOPMENT  PROGRAMS
in Chapter 2, we found that  very few of the projects had a direct or significant
positive economic impact on either the communities or the municipal corpora-
tions,  although  the  subprojects  were often  billed as being economic in  their
efforts.
It may be useful to classify and define the  subprojects under  two categories
as we see them.  One category we call social infrastructure and the other eco-
nomic infrastructure.
Categories Of Municipal Subprojects:
Social Infrastructure/Economic  Infrastructure
A rough way of  stating  this classification is to say that  social infrastructure
makes people more comfortable  in their poverty, while economic infrastructure
serves directly to alter the condition of poverty itself by encouraging new invest-
ment, new employment, and increased income.  Both are important,  and social
infrastructure  is often  necessary to create some preconditions for improvements
in productivity.  However, there appear to be limits to the extent that municipal
governments can develop, finance, and manage services  and social infrastructure
unless economic growth  is also occurring, and it may be necessary to  promote
municipal development activity more directly aimed at the economic factors as
the  next  stage  in  municipal  development.  We have classified municipal  sub-
projects under the two headings as follows:
Social  infrastructure:  municipal  building;  street  paving; refuse  collection
(residential); residential  water,  sewer, electrical installations; housing; clinics,
health  posts, primary  and  secondary schools; street lighting; parks and playing
fields; and street cleaning.
Economic  infrastructure:  transportation  terminals  (see  below);  highways
(feeder, secondary); industrial waste disposal; electric, water, and sewer installa-
tions  of  industrial  capacity;  land  acquisition  and  preparation  for  industrial,
commercial, or tourism uses; vocational training facilities;  crop storage facilities;
input storage facilities; and irrigation systems.
Municipal markets, slaughterhouses, and transportation terminals (bus stations,
ferry terminals) may fall under either heading, depending on th.eir  scale and use
patterns.  Most  of  the  markets and  slaughterhouses we observed were social
rather than economic, offering better housing for the same activity. Where such
facilities are of sufficient scale to encourage new production, diversification, and
commercialization of  production,  we would regard them as economic.  Where
passenger terminals include new commercial space and activity for new entre-
preneurs, they lean toward the economic.  Where  they merely replace wood with
cement  and  the  same  businesses take  the  space, they may represent  nothing
more than beautification, and thus be primarily social in impact.As defined above, few of the commonly financed municipal/MDI subprojects,
with  the  exception  of  feeder  roads,  fell under  the  economic  infrastructure
heading.  In  our  experience (and past  involvement in industrial location  ques-
tions), parks, paved and lighted streets, or a new municipal office building may
make a marginal difference  to  an industrial  investor, but  they will not  be de-
terminant.  We feel that the  balance should be shifted in the future  to more of
the economic category of infrastructure, without, of course, neglecting the other
factors and needs.
As Tables 2.1 and 2.2 on project benefits (see Chapter 2) show, we found that
the municipal corporations did not always fare well economically under the MDI
lending programs.  Municipalities in all the countries we have visited and studied
have frequently  found themselves in worse financial condition because of such
projects, having to add staff to manage them, having increased their indebtedness
to  the  point  of being ineligible for further financial support, finding that man-
agina the new facility is more complex and costly than anticipated, and that the
community is not  willing to  pay  the  user fees, that  the concessionaire in the
bath house loses money and fails to  renew his contract.  The facilities have not
added to  the  tax base in any measurable way by creating new economic activity.
Often such projects as municipal markets and slaughterhouses represent nothing
more than  the  same people  doing the  same thing, but  inside a better  building
(if the maintenance machinery works).
Employment generation  is often  cited  as a community economic benefit  re-
lated  to  municipal  projects.  This  generalization is  difficult  to  sustain  after
visiting the sites.  In our observations the projects are built using labor-intensive
methods  requiring large numbers of persons carrying materials, moving earth,
and mixing cement, and a few skilled laborers laying block, installing plumbing,
or building roof supports.  The skilled laborers often move from town  to town
or work for a contractor  full time, while the unskilled are local farmers or farm
laborers.  When the project or complex of facilities is built by a contractor,  as in
Guatemala, the firm is often based in another, larger city.  The result, in terms of
local employment  generated  by  the  construction  projects, is that  the  work is
temporary, supplementai to  other income, rather than representing a new career
for  the  local  workers.  There may be some marginal multiplier effect  in  the
form of  increased consumption,  benefiting local shopkeepers, and the laborers
may be exposed  to  some construction  skills, which are always marketable  in a
developing country.  But none of this adds up to significant economic income-
generating impact.
We therefore  recommend that municipal development strategies take explicit
account of  the economic  growth element and  that,  where it is appropriate in
terms  of  such  development  priorities  as  increasing rural employment  or dis-
persing industry,  opportunities  be  seized  by  the  MDls and  the local govern-
ments  to  expand  their  involvement in creating well-planned and designed eco-
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